Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law
Volume 9 | Issue 2

Article 4

3-1-1995

The Progeny of Lee v. Weisman: Can Student-Invited
Prayer at Public School Graduations Still be
Constitutional?
Thomas A. Schweitzer

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/jpl
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Education Law Commons, and the Religion Law
Commons
Recommended Citation
Thomas A. Schweitzer, The Progeny of Lee v. Weisman: Can Student-Invited Prayer at Public School Graduations Still be Constitutional?, 9
BYU J. Pub. L. 291 (1995).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/jpl/vol9/iss2/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brigham Young University
Journal of Public Law by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

The Progeny of Lee v. Weisman: Can Student-Invited
Prayer at Public School Graduations Still be
Constitutional?
Thomas A. Schweitzer*
I.

INTRODUCfiON

Over thirty years ago, the United States Supreme Court ended the
American practice1 of reciting prayers in public schools, holding that this
violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 2 Just three
years ago in Lee v. Weisman 3 the Court held that a prayer led by a rabbi
who was invited by public school authorities to pray at a public school's
graduation was also unconstitutional.
After Lee, numerous observers concluded that the Court had
outlawed any form of prayer at public school graduations. 4 Nevertheless, several courts have allowed prayer to survive a constitutional
challenge under certain situations. Prayers in public school graduations
have been found constitutional if they are: (1) requested by the graduating
students rather than by school authorities, and (2) if they are delivered by
students. 5
* Copyright C!1> 1995 by Thomas A. Schweitzer. Associate Professor of Law, Jacob D.
Fuchsberg Law Center, Touro College. M.A. 1968, University of Wisconsin; Ph.D. 1971,
University of Wisconsin; J.D. 1977, Yale Law School.
1. While our system of free public schools originated in the mid-19th century, the
tradition of prayer in schools dates back to the 17th century.
2. School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); see U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . . ").
3. Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992); see Dina F. El-Sayed, What Is the Coun
Trying to Establish?: An Analysis ofLeev. Weisman, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 441 (1994);
Marilyn Perrin, Leev. Weisman: Unanswered Prayers, 21 PEPP. L. REv. 207 (1994); Thomas
A. Schweitzer, Lee v. Weisman; Whither the Establishment Clause and the Lemon v.
Kurtzman Three-Pronged Test?, 9 TOURO L. REv. 401 (1993).
4. See Gearon v. Loudoun County Sch. Bd., 844 F. Supp. 1097 (E.D. Va. 1993);
Christina E. Martin, Student-Initiated Religious Expression after Mergens and Weisman, 61
U. CHI. L. REv. 1565 (1994); Henry J. Reske, Graduation Prayers, Part II, A.B.A. J., July
1993, at 14, 16.
5. Jones v. Clear Creek lndep. Sch. Dist., 930 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1991) vacated and
remanded for reconsideration in lightojLee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 3020 (1992), on remand,
977 F.2d 963, (5th Cir. 1992), cen. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2950 (1993); Ingebretsen v. Jackson
Pub. Sch. Dist., 864 F. Supp. 1473, 1479, 1488 (S.D. Miss. 1994) (supporting a broad statute
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This article will first discuss the Lee v. Weisman holding. Second,
it will examine the holdings of courts that have ruled on school prayer
cases arising after Lee. Finally, this article will analyze whether the
"student-initiated exception" to Lee is consistent with the First Amendment.
II.

LEE

V. WEISMAN

As proponents of the exception for student-initiated graduation
prayers have pointed out, the Supreme Court in Lee v. Weisman did not
proscribe public school graduation prayers per se. 6 Rather, the Court
narrowly tailored its decision to the facts of the case and emphasized the
pervasive government involvement in planning and preparing for
graduation prayers. Thus, given what appears to be a narrow ruling, it
is not impossible to argue that graduation prayers in different circumstances may still be constitutional.
The 1992 Lee decision originated when Daniel Weisman, a Jew, was
offended during the middle school graduation of his daughter because the
Baptist minister that gave the invocation and benediction asked the
audience to stand for a moment of silence to give thanks to Jesus Christ.
Three years later, when Mr. Weisman's younger daughter Deborah was
to graduate from the same school, he asked the middle school's principal
to eliminate the graduation prayers. 7 The principal refused to conduct
the ceremony without prayer but attempted to placate Weisman by asking
a rabbi to deliver the invocation and benediction at that year's graduation. 8 Pursuant to school district policy, the invited rabbi was given a
set of "Guidelines for Civic Occasions" concerning public prayers at

permitting "nonproselytizing student-initiated voluntary prayer" during a variety of "schoolrelated student events" enjoined except for high school graduation or commencement
ceremonies following Jones); Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 851 F. Supp. 446 (M.D. Fla.
1994); Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 821 F. Supp. 638 (D. Idaho 1993), aff'dinpartand
denied in part, 41 F.3d 447 (9th Cir. 1994); see also Harris, 41 F.3d at 459 (Wright, J.,
dissenting in pertinent part).
Other courts appear to believe that Lee contains no exception even for prayers at public
school graduations requested, written, and delivered by students. Harris, 41 F.3d 447; ACLU
of New Jersey v. Black Horse Pike Regional Bd. of Educ., Civ. No. 93-5368 (3d Cir. filed
Jun. 25, 1993); Gearon, 844 F. Supp. at 1097.
6. As one court noted, "The Court had the opportunity in Lee to ban all prayer at
graduation ceremonies. Rather than focus upon and, indeed, emphasize the need for fact
sensitivity, the Court could have stated that any prayer at public high school graduation
ceremonies violates the Constitution under any circumstances. It did not do so. Or, the Court
could have required that separate baccalaureate services be held in lieu of including invocations
and/or benedictions in official graduation ceremonies. Again, the Court declined to so hold."
Adler, 851 F. Supp. at 456.
7. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2652.
8. /d.
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nonsectarian civic ceremonies and was advised that his invocation and
benediction should be nonsectarian. 9
Despite these steps taken by the school district to have a nonsectarian
prayer, the Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the lower courts and
struck down the school's graduation prayers. Justice Kennedy, writing
for the 5-4 majority, argued that "[t]he government involvement with
religious activity in this case is pervasive, to the point of creating a statesponsored and state-directed religious exercise in a public school. " 10
Thus characterized, the prayers plainly conflicted with basic First
Amendment principles of separation of church and state. 11
III.

JONES V. CLEAR CREEK INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT

The facts of Jones v. Clear Creek Independent School Distrid 2
were quite different from those in Lee. In Jones, high school senior
Pamela Jones and other graduating seniors sued to enjoin invocations and

9. Id.; see Thomas A. Schweitzer, Lee v. Weisman and the Establishment Clause: Are
Invocations and Benedictions at Public School Graduations Constitutionally Unspeakable?, 69
U. DEr. MERCY L. REV., 113, 119-21 (1992).
10. Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2655. Justice Kennedy also concluded that "the principal directed
and controlled the content of the prayer," id. at 2656, and that the students attending the
graduation ceremony were subject to subtle "coercive pressure" from both the public and their
peers to participate in the rabbi's prayers, id. at 2658. But to state that the school principal
"controlled the content" of the rabbi's prayers is a considerable exaggeration as the rabbi never
submitted the prayer texts to the principal or anyone else fore review before praying. See id.
at 2658.
There is also considerable question regarding the degree of "coercion" that existed for the
students to "participate" in the rabbi's prayers. Justice Kennedy conceded that the significance
of the act of standing for prayer is ambiguous; he acknowledged this can represent adherence
to a view or simple respect for the views of others. Id.
Justice Scalia caustically attacked the majority's "boundless, and boundlessly manipulable,
test of psychological coercion." Id. at 2679 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Others have similarly
questioned the validity of the Court's social science conclusions. See, e.g., Donald N. Bersoff,
Autonomy for Vulnerable Populations: The Supreme Court's Reckless Disregard for SelfDetermination and Social Science, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1569, 1603-04 (1992) (agreeing with
Justice Scalia and criticizing the Supreme Court's selective use of psychological research in its
"coercion" analysis in Lee); Scott V. Carroll, Note, Lee v. Weisman: Amateur Psychology or
an Accurate Representation of Adolescent Development; How Should Courts Evaluate
Psychological Evidence?, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & PoL'Y 513 (1994).
11. See, e.g., Allegheny County v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 591
(1989); Wallacev. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,425 (1962) ("It
is not part of the business of government to compose official prayers for any group of the
American people to recite as a part of a religious program carried on by government.");
Everson v. Board ofEduc. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947); see also West Virginia State
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) ("If there is any fixed star in our
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to
confess by word or act their faith therein.").
12. Jones v. Clear Creek lndep. Sch. Dist., 930 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1991).
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benedictions which contained overt Christian references. 13
These
prayers had traditionally been included in their high school's graduation
ceremonies. 14
Three weeks before the trial was to commence, however, the school
district's Board of Trustees adopted a resolution specifying that the
decision whether to include the prayers in the graduation ceremonies was
up to the students and that, in any event, the prayers were to be
"nonsectarian and nonproselytizing in nature. " 15 Applying the familiar
three-pronged Establishment Clause test from Lemon v. Kurtzman, 16 the
Fifth Circuit concluded that the resolution satisfied all three prongs: (1)
The Board's resolution was said to have had the "secular purpose" of
"solemnizing" 17 the graduation occasion; (2) its primary effect was not
to advance religion (because the graduating students affected were almost

13. ld. at 417.
14. [d.
15. The resolution was drafted by the district's counsel to conform with Judge Merritt's
opinion in Stein v. Plainwell Community Schs., 822 F.2d 1406, 1409 (6th Cir. 1987). The
resolution provided:
I. The use of an invocation and/or benediction at high school graduation
exercise shall rest within the discretion of the graduating senior class, with
the advice and counsel of the senior class principal;
2. The invocation and benediction, if used, shall be given by a student
volunteer; and
3. Consistent with the principle of equal liberty of conscience, the invocation
and benediction shall be nonsectarian and nonproselytizing in nature.
Jones, 930 F.2d at 417.
16. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). While Justices Ginsberg and Breyer have not yet expressed
opinions discussing the Lemon test, at least five of the other Supreme Court Justices have
expressed either outright opposition to the test, see, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578,
636 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("pessimistic evaluation" of Lemon); Lamb's Chapel v.
Center Moriches Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141, 2150 (1993) (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 112 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (Lemon test is "a constitutional theory [that] has no basis in the history of the
amendment it seeks to interpret, is difficult to apply and yields unprincipled results."); County
of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 656 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("Substantial revision of our
Establishment Clause doctrine may be in order."), or argued that it needs revision, see, e.g.,
Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 429 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (voicing "doubts about
the entanglement test"). In Lee, Justice Kennedy advanced his agenda by ignoring Lemon and
relying instead on the "coercion test" which he wants the Court to adopt. Lee v. Weisman,
112 S. Ct. 2649, 2655 (1992).
For a look at a recent case construing modern Establishment jurisprudence in another
context, see generally ScottS. Thomas, Note, Beyond a Sour Lemon: A Look at Grumet v.
Board of Education of the Kiryas Joel Village School District, 8 B. Y.U. J. PuB. L. 531 (1994).
17. Justice O'Connor first suggested the justification of religious public ceremonies in
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984): "[G]overnmentacknowledgments of religion serve,
in the only ways reasonably possible in our culture, the legitimate secular purpose ... of
solemnizing public occasions." ld. at 693 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).

291]

THE PROGENY OF LEE V. WEISMAN

295

adults and were consequently mature and not impressionable concerning
any religious influences of the prayers); and (3) the fact that the prayers
were written and presented by student volunteers eliminated the risk of
excessive entanglement, notwithstanding the fact that once a year the
senior class principal was called upon to "pre-screen" the proposed
invocations for sectarianism and proselytization. 18
Surprisingly, after the Supreme Court vacated and remanded Jones
for reconsideration in light of its decision in Lee, the Fifth Circuit again
reached its initial holding. Following that holding, the Supreme Court
denied plaintiffs' petition for certiorari. 19 The Fifth Circuit panel again
concluded that the graduation prayers did not violate any of the three
prongs of the Lemon test, but went on to scrutinize the prayers under the
"endorsement test" 20 and the Lee "coercion test." The court concluded
that "endorsement" of religion was absent since the resolution did not
mandate an invocation but merely permitted one if the students so
chose. 21 In addition, the Fifth Circuit found that the "coercion" which
required the proscription of the prayers in Lee was absent in Jones since
the resolution expressly required that the state government not decide
whether prayers would occur, leaving that decision to the graduating
students. The resolution also precluded anyone but a student volunteer
not chosen by government officials from offering the prayers, thereby
ensuring a different person each year and avoiding use of the same
clergyman. Finally, the resolution only specified that the prayers be
"nonsectarian and non-proselytizing," unlike the detailed guidelines
provided to the rabbi by the principal. 22

18. Jones, 930 F.2d at 419-23.
19. Jones v. Clear Creek lndep. Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2950 (1993).
20. Justice O'Connor proposed the "endorsement" test for Establishment Clause
violations in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69 (1985):
The Establishment Clause is infringed when the government makes adherence to
religion relevant to a person's standing in the political community. Direct
governmental action endorsing religion or a particular religious practice is invalid
under this approach because it sends a message to nonadherents that they are
outsiders, not full members ofthe political community, and an accompanying message
to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community.
ld. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
21. See Jones, 977 F.2d at 968-69.
22. ld. at 969-71. The court further concluded that there was less danger of
impermissible psychological pressure to participate in the prayers in Jones than in Lee:
We think that the graduation prayers permitted by the Resolution place less
psychological pressure on students than the prayers at issue in Lee because all
students, after having participated in the decision of whether prayers will be given,
are aware that any prayers represent the will of their peers, who are less able to
coerce participation than an authority figure from the state or clergy.
ld. at 971.
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The central issue in Jones-whether an Establishment Clause
violation can be avoided when students vote to have graduation prayers
and deliver the prayers themselves-reappeared again in an appellate
court decision. 23 While the Idaho federal district court in Harris v.
Joint School District No. 241 relied on Jones, 24 the Ninth Circuit
rejected its approach and struck down the graduation prayers at issue. 25
High school graduation programs in Idaho School District 241 had
sometimes included invocations and benedictions, and the Grangeville
High School senior class voted to have a student give an invocation and
benediction at its graduation. 26 Phyllis Harris, the mother of three
children who attended school in the district, sued in 1991 to enjoin this
practice. 27
In this case the school district superintendent had instructed all
principals in the district to let graduating seniors vote whether they
wanted prayers at their graduation ceremonies. 28 The superintendent's

23. Harrisv. JointSch. Dist. No. 241,821 F. Supp. 638 (D. Idaho 1993), aff'dinpan
and denied in pan, 41 F.3d 447 (9th Cir. 1994).
24. Harris, 821 F. Supp. at 638.
25. Harris, 41 F.3d at 447.
26. Harris, 821 F. Supp. at 641.
27. Robert L. Phillips, The Constitutionality of High School Graduation Prayers under
Harris v. School District No. 241, 8 B.Y.U. J. PuB. L. 491, 504-05 (1994). The district court
denied plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and deferred ruling on motions for
summary judgment by the plaintiffs and intervenor by the defendants pending the Supreme
Court's decision in Lee. Harris, 821 F. Supp. at 638. Harris was subsequently "administratively terminated" and was reopened with further discovery and briefs by the parties after the
Supreme Court's June 24, 1992 decision. Jd.
28. The superintendent sent the following memorandum to the principals of District 241:
I just want to make sure we are all doing the same thing for Invocation and
Benediction at graduation. The school board is permitting Invocation and Benediction
at graduation and not requiring Invocation and Benediction at graduation. These are
the guidelines I want you to follow:
I. Let the senior students vote on whether they do or don't want Invocation and
Benediction at graduation.
2. If the answer is yes, then they should vote on whether they want a minister
or a student to say the Invocation and Benediction.
3. If the students vote for a minister, then the students should vote on which
minister they want to say the Invocation and Benediction.
4. If the students vote for students to say the Invocation and Benediction, you
may want to have the 3rd and 4th students in GPA do this. Make everything an
option and let the students vote. We will dictate nothing to the students. If a
student does not want to go to graduation, I would not force the issue. Give
him/her the diploma after the graduation exercise.
Harris, 821 F. Supp. at 641-42 n.7. The school district informed the court that the superintendent's memorandum did not change prior practice but merely reaffirmed the school

291]

THE PROGENY OF LEE V. WEISMAN

297

guidelines put this choice entirely up to the students. 29 While it had
earlier deferred ruling on the pending motions for summary judgment
pending the Supreme Court decision, the court emphasized that the
Supreme Court's ruling was heavily fact-dependent and did little to
resolve the issues in Harris. 30
However, the court concluded that "the Supreme Court is willing to
tolerate some prayer at graduation ceremonies " 31 because it had passed
up two opportunities to impose a blanket ban on such prayers. 32 The
key fact in Harris, unlike Jones, was that the senior graduating students
themselves, rather than faculty or administrators, determined every
element of the graduation and "the record demonstrat[ed] that faculty and
administrators [had] little or no involvement in that process. " 33
Accordingly, the court concluded that "the practice of allowing students
to determine whether or not to include prayer in their graduation
ceremonies does not violate the Establishment Clause. " 34
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit totally rejected the reasoning of the
district court and of Jones, on which the district court had relied. 35 In
district's neutrality on the issue. The only change in the district's practice from that of the
preceding fifteen years was to supply students with written ballots and to insert in the
graduation programs a disclaimer stating that School District 241 "neither promotes nor
endorses any statements made by any person involved in the graduation ceremony," and that
any statements made during the graduation ceremony "should not be considered the opinions
or beliefs of the District, the Board of Trustees or the Superintendent." ld. at 642.
29. In 1993, the seniors at Clearwater Valley High, also in the district, voted for a
moment of silence at graduation without any prayer. ld. at 641 n.6; Harris, 41 F.3d at 453.
At Grangeville High, no school official reviewed the prayers prior to commencement, and, at
the graduation ceremony, no one was asked to participate in the prayer by standing, bowing
their heads, or removing their hats. ld. at 453. In addition, the following disclaimer had
appeared since 1991 in the Grangeville High commencement programs:
The Board of Trustees of Joint School District No. 241 neither promotes nor endorses
any statements made by any person involved in the graduation ceremony. The
District endorses each person's free exercise of speech and religion and any comments
or statements made during the graduation ceremony should not be considered the
opinions or beliefs of the District, the Board of Trustees or the Superintendent.
Harris, 821 F. Supp. at 642.
30. Harris, 821 F. Supp. at 640.
31. ld. at 643.
32. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992); Jones v. Clear Creek lndep. Sch.
Dist., 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992).
33. Harris, 821 F. Supp. at 643. Student control of the entire process was a reality:
While Principal Leuck recommended that Class President Mike Heath write down the prayer
and give her a copy of it, he did neither but was still permitted to give the invocation and
benediction. Phillips, supra note 27, at 504-05.
34. Harris, 821 F. Supp. at 643-44. Although the court indicated it was not bound to
follow Jones, much of the reasoning in Jones was "persuasive." ld. at 643.
35. "As implied by this discussion, we find the reasoning of Jones and cases following
it flawed." Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 41 F.3d 447, 457 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Adler
v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 851 F. Supp. 446 (M.D. Fla. 1994)).
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the court of appeal's view, Lee and the Ninth Circuit's earlier decision
in Collins v. Chandler Unified School Districf6 required the conclusion
that the student-initiated graduation prayers were unconstitutional.
Ignoring differences such as the fact that graduating seniors and not
members of the clergy delivered the prayers at Grangeville High School,
and that the praying students were requested to do so by their classmates
and not by the high school principal, the court asserted that "Grangeville
High's graduation is in many if not most respects like the graduation at
issue in Lee. " 37 The Ninth Circuit in Collins had held unconstitutional
a public high school principal's permission to the Student Council to
begin assemblies during the school day with a prayer by a student; the
court assumed without discussion that Collins controlled the much
different graduation ceremony context. 38
The core of the Lee decision was the following:
These dominant facts mark and control the confines of our
decision: [1] State officials direct the performance of a formal religious
exercise at . . . graduation ceremonies for secondary schools. [2]
Even for those students who object to the religious exercise, their
attendance and participation in the state-sponsored religious activity are
in a fair and real sense obligatory, though the school district does not
require attendance as a condition for receipt of the diploma. 39

The Ninth Circuit began by attempting to tailor the facts of Harris
into this pattern. This court stated that pervasive "state involvement"
was present in the use of graduation prayers when "the school ultimately
controls the event" 40 and that "the seniors have authority to make decisions regarding graduation only because the school allows them to have
it. " 41 Secondly, the school provided the building for the graduation
ceremony and subsidized it. 42 The court regarded the senior class which
had voted for prayers as an "agent" to which the school district had
invalidly "delegated" its authority to make decisions regarding a school-

36. Collins v. Chandler Unified Sch. Dist., 644 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1981).
37. Harris, 41 F.3d at 452.
38. The court's only reference to the significant factual differences between prayer as
an everyday practice in public schools and prayer once a year at a graduation ceremony
attended by families and friends is the simplistic observation "[t]hat school officials establish
the time of graduation renders irrelevant the fact that graduation does not take place during
normal school hours." /d. at 454 n.5.
39. /d. at 451 (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2655 (1992)).
40. ld. at 454. As in Collins, the Harris court found "no meaningful distinction"
between school officials acting directly and school officials "merely permitting students to
direct the exercises." ld.
41. /d.
42. /d.
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controlled event; giving majorities such powers would undermine the
counter-majoritarian protections of the First Amendment and would inject
"divisiveness" into the public schools. 43
The court rejected the claim that the school district had made the
Grangeville High School graduation ceremony an open forum, as the
school district contended. Only speakers chosen by the majority of the
senior class were allowed, and this closed the ceremony to minority
views. 44 In addition, the court implied that these graduation prayers
were coercive, stating that "[s]tudents are as obligated to attend and
participate in graduation prayers, either by bowing their heads or
maintain[ing] respectful silence, at Grangeville High graduation as at the
high school commencement discussed in Lee." 45
The court completed its analysis with a perfunctory application of the
first two prongs of the three-pronged test from Lemon. 46 The court
agreed with the Collins decision that "the invocation of assemblies with

43. ld. at 455.
44. The court said these facts made other cases "inapposite," including Lamb's Chapel
v. Center Moriches Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141 (1993), Board of Educ. of Westside
Community Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990), and Garnett v. Renton Sch. Dist. No. 403,
987 F.2d 641 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 72 (1993). Harris, 41 F.3d at 456. In an
"open forum" under traditional First Amendment doctrine, the government may not limit the
speech that occurs. /d. at 458. The court's conclusion that the graduation ceremony was not
an open forum disposed of the argument that the students had a freedom of speech right to
deliver the graduation prayers. In addition, since the students were free to pray outside of the
graduation ceremony, the Court rejected defendants' argument that they had a free exercise
right to pray at the ceremony. /d.
45. /d. at 457 (citing Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2658 (1992)). This conclusion
appears to contradict the defendants' claims, unrefuted by plaintiffs and quoted with evident
agreement by the court, that "[n]o one is asked to participate in the prayer by standing, bowing
their heads, or removing their hats" /d. at 453.
46. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). To survive a challenge to its
constitutionality under the Establishment Clause, a state action or enactment must have a
secular purpose, its primary effect must be neither to advance nor inhibit religion, and it must
not foster excessive entanglement between government and religion. /d. This widely-criticized
test has been the established standard for Establishment Clause violations for over twenty years
but has been criticized by at least five current or former Supreme Court Justices. See
discussion supra note 16. Nevertheless, the test's much-anticipated demise has never come
about, and the Supreme Court in recent cases has increasingly chosen to disregard Lemon, thus
further confusing the rather incoherent muddle of Establishment jurisprudence. See e.g., Lee
v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). In Lee,
Justice Kennedy, the pivotal fifth vote who wrote the majority opinion, was clearly intent on
promoting his "coercion" test for Establishment Clause violations, barely mentioning Lemon.
See generally Lee, 112 S. Ct. at 2649. This has further confused matters for lower court
judges, many of whom, in order to play it safe, apply both the Lemon and coercion tests, as
the Ninth Circuit did in Harris. Harris, 41 F.3d at 451. In Jones the Fifth Circuit applied
both these tests as well as Justice O'Connor's "endorsement" test. Jones v. Clear Creek Indep.
Sch. Dist., 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992).
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prayer has no apparent secular purpose" 47 and rejected the school
district's argument that the secular purpose was to "solemnize the
occasion," as prayer was "objectively and inherently religious. " 48 In
addition, because the graduation prayers were indistinguishable from
prayers recited in a church service, the court concluded that the primary
effect of graduation prayers was to advance religion in violation of the
Establishment Clause. 49

V.

0rHER RECENT CASES

A case involving student-sponsored prayers at a public high school
graduation is currently pending in the Third Circuit. 50 After the
authorities at the Highland Regional High School in New Jersey decided
to permit a student-sponsored prayer at the graduation exercises, the
American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey sued ten days before
graduation seeking to enjoin all such prayers. Following a hearing on
four days prior to the graduation, the federal district court denied
plaintiff's application for a preliminary injunction, noting that "there was
no evidence of encouragement or sponsorship by the defendants, and that
in fact students at the high school were responsible for both the decision
to have a prayer at the graduation and the selection of the student who
would give the prayer. " 51 The next day, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed this decision and preliminarily enjoined all graduation
prayers in the school district, deeming the case essentially indistinguishable from Lee. 52 Justice Souter denied a stay of the Third Circuit's

47. Harris, 41 F.3d at 458 (quoting Collins v. Chandler Unified Sch. Dist., 644 F.2d
759, 762 (1981)). The defendant school district in Collins, of course, had not even suggested
any secular purpose for the school prayers, so the court had no choice but to conclude as it did.
/d. This conclusion on an uncontroverted point, however, should not be taken as a universal
truth.
48. /d.
49. /d. The court did not discuss excessive entanglement. /d.
50. ACLU of New Jersey v. Black Horse Pike Regional Bd. ofEduc., Civ. No. 93-2651
(D.N.J. Mar. 29, 1994).
51. /d.
52. The court made the following observation:
[T]he graduation ceremony is a school sponsored event; the fact that the school
board has chosen to delegate the decision regarding one segment of the ceremony
to the members of the graduating class does not alter that sponsorship, does not
diminish the effect of a prayer on students who do not share the same or any
religious perspective, and does not serve to distinguish, in any material way, the
facts of this case from the facts of Lee v. Weisman ....
ACLU of New Jersey v. Black Horse Pike, Civ. No. 93-5368 (3d Cir. June 25, 1993), cert.
denied,_ U.S._, June 25, 1993, denied request for vacating injunction, Civ. No. 93-5368
(3d Cir. June 28, 1993), permanent injunction entered on remand, Civ. No. 93-2651 (D.N.J.
Mar. 29, 1994).

291]

THE PROGENY OF LEE V. WEISMAN

301

order on graduation day, and in early 1994 the district court, on the same
record, permanently enjoined all graduation prayers in the school
district. 53
In two other recent federal district court cases, Gearon v. Loudoun
County School Board, 54 and Adler v. Duval County School Board, 55
opposite conclusions were reached regarding high school graduation
prayer. Both cases involved the same circumstances as Jones and Harris,
namely that, in both of the recent cases, plaintiffs challenged the
constitutionality of school district policies which permitted students to
request and deliver prayers at graduation ceremonies.
Pursuant to a school board resolution in Gearon, the following ballot
was distributed to seniors for a vote at each of the four Loudoun County,
Virginia high schools:
Do we, the Senior Class at [school name], wish to have a
nonsectarian, non-proselytizing invocation/benediction/prayer or
inspirational message presented at graduation?
Yes, I vote in favor of the above proposition.
No, I vote against the above proposition. 56
The students at all four schools voted in favor of graduation prayer. The
messages delivered by students at two of the schools were clearly
prayers, while the other two were clearly inspirational but not theological. 57 The court agreed with plaintiffs' argument that graduation prayers
are per se unconstitutional. 58 However, in light of its recognition that
no other court had so held, 59 the court went on to accept plaintiffs'

53. The district judge made it clear that he still believed that injunctive relief was not
warranted but was constrained to bow to superior authority. Black Horse Pike, Civ. No. 932651 (D.N.J. Mar. 29, 1994). An appeal of the permanent injunction was argued in the Third
Circuit in January 1995 and was pending when this article went to press.
54. 844 F. Supp. 1097 (E.D. Va. 1993).
55. 851 F. Supp. 446 (M.D. Fla. 1994).
56. Gearon, 844 F. Supp. at 1100.
57. They were addressed to "Dear Heavenly Father" and "Almighty," respectively. /d.
at 110 I. The language of the other two messages were inspirational but not theological: one
endorsed a "spiritual" answer and the other included the admonition, "Let our faith guide us
through these lessons of life . . . . " /d. at 1102.
58. The court was persuaded that the correct view was the one represented by plaintiffs'
primary argument, i.e., that a constitutional violation inherently occurs when, in a secondary
school graduation setting, a prayer is offered, regardless of who makes the decision that the
prayer will be given and who authorizes the actual wording of the remarks. ld. at 1099. The
court went so far as to claim that "[t]o involuntarily subject a student at such an event [his/her
graduation] to a display of religion that is offensive ... to his or her own religion or lack of
rei igion is to constructively exclude that student from graduation, given the options the student
has." /d. at 1100. Nor could the state simply "delegate" the decision regarding prayers at
graduation to the graduating class, because "[t]he notion that a person's constitutional rights
may be subject to a majority vote is itself anathema." /d.
59. Jd. at 1100 n.4.
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secondary position, holding that all four graduation ceremonies entailed
excessive state entanglement of the public schools with religion in
violation of the Lemon test: they were sponsored by the school district
and arranged by the principals who organized the student vote and
reviewed the students' remarks prior to the ceremony in three of the
schools.
The court in Adler reached the opposite result on similar facts. The
Duval County School Superintendent initially directed school principals
to eliminate graduation prayers after Lee was decided. However, after
this action met with protests, the superintendent asked the board's legal
counsel to research the issue. She later advised him that student-initiated
and student-led prayer would be permissible as long as the administration
and faculty did not participate in the decision. On May 5, 1993, counsel
issued a memorandum to all county high school principals which stated:
This area of the law is far from clear at this time, and we have
been threatened by lawsuits from both sides on the issue depending on
what action we take. The key to the Lee v. Wisei1Uln [sic] decision was
that the prayer given at that graduation ceremony was directed and
initiated by the school system, which made it unconstitutional, rather
than by permissive student choice and initiative. With that premise in
mind, the following guidelines may be of some assistance:
1. The use of a brief opening and/or closing message, not to
exceed two minutes, at high school graduation exercises shall rest
within the discretion of the graduating senior class;
2. The opening and/or closing message shall be given by a
student volunteer, in the graduating senior class, chosen by the
graduating senior class as a whole;
3. If the graduating senior class chooses to use an opening
and/or closing message, the content of that message shall be
prepared by the student volunteer and shall not be monitored or
otherwise reviewed by Duval County School Board [sic], its
officers or employees.
The purpose of these guidelines is to allow the students to
direct their own graduation message without monitoring or review
by school officials. ro

60. Adler v. Duval County Sch. Bd., 851 F. Supp. 446, 449 (M.D. Fla. 1994) (quoting
the deposition of the Superintendent of Schools, Larry Zenke). At its June I meeting, the
school board voted 4-3 against a proposal to substitute a moment of silence for any studentinitiated message at graduation; thus the May 5 memorandum became official Board policy.
/d.
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Pursuant to these guidelines, the graduating seniors at ten of the
seventeen county high schools voted to include prayer in their graduation
ceremonies. 61
The district court analyzed the challenged policy under both the
Lemon test and Lee, and, based on several reasons, concluded that it
satisfied both standards. First, eschewing any effort to analyze the
motives, intentions, and purposes of individual administrators and board
members, the court found that the policy in the May 5 memorandum had
the secular purpose of "retain[ing], the graduating students so desired, the
giving of messages to solemnize the occasion and to observe and protect
the right of free speech of the students giving such messages. " 62
Second, the court found that the policy's primary effect was not to
advance religion because adherence to the guidelines might not result in
any prayer: seven of the seventeen schools concerned had no prayers in
their graduation ceremonies, and, of those schools which did have prayer,
none was initiated by public authorities. Third, the public high school
graduation ceremonies were designated, limited public fora as they were
traditionally held at coliseums, not in the school buildings, and nearly the
entire program consisted of speeches by leaders of both the students and
the community. Because the religious speech was communicated in a
public forum, the state neither endorsed nor approved of it. The court
determined that the school board policy did not entail excessive
entanglement of governmental and religious institutions; indeed, there was
no entanglement: the students had total freedom to determine the content
of their messages as they were not reviewed by any school official.
Turning to the "coercion" test of Lee, the court found that the
circumstances in Adler were quite different from those in Providence.
The guidelines did not mandate or solicit graduation prayers; they merely
permitted them. The high school principal did not decide to have the
prayers or designate the prayer-giver, as in Lee. Unlike the facts in Lee,

61. /d. Apparently the other seven schools' graduation ceremonies were limited to
secular messages. /d. at 449-50.
62. /d. at 453. Such a finding of secular purpose was supported by two recent cases.
In Chabad-Lubavitch ofGeorgiav. Miller, 5 F.3d 1383 (11th Cir. 1993) (en bane), the court
held that the State of Georgia would not violate the Establishment Clause were it to permit a
Jewish group to erect a Chanukah menorah-a religious symbol-on the plaza in front of the
state capitol building. Permitting the display, the court held, "would advance the secular
purpose of providing an arena for its citizenry's exercise of the constitutional right to free
speech," and would therefore not violate the Lerrwn test. Miller, 5 F.3d at 1389, quoted in
Adler, 851 F. Supp. at 452-53. Similarly, the Sixth Circuit had recently declared that "[A]
policy of treating religious speech the same as all other speech certainly serves a secular
purpose." Americans United For Separation of Church and State v. City of Grand Rapids, 980
F.2d 1538, 1543 (6th Cir. 1992) (en bane), quoted in Adler, 851 F. Supp. at 453.

304

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 9

only students, and not clergy, gave the prayers. In addition, their prayers
exerted less psychological pressure on other students than the prayers in
Lee because the students realized that the prayers represented the will of
their peers who were less able to coerce participation than authoritative
figures from the state or clergy. 63 The court concluded that the
challenged school board policy did not violate the Establishment Clause
and granted summary judgment for the defendants. 64
VI.

ANALYSIS

The remaining question for decision by the United States Supreme
Court in the area of prayer at public high school graduations is whether
the Establishment Clause is violated when students request, compose, and
deliver graduation prayers, and school districts and administrators merely
acquiesce. Despite Justice Kennedy's verbal overkill in Lee and his
insistence on finding state coercion where there was none, 65 the Lee
decision was narrowly tailored to the facts. The three most important
facts were that the high school principal decided that an invocation and
benediction would be included in the graduation ceremony, he invited a
rabbi to deliver them, and he provided the rabbi with guidelines and
recommendations concerning the content of the prayers. None of these
factors was present in Jones v. Clear Creek Independent School District,
Harris v. Joint School District No. 241, American Civil Liberties Union
of New Jersey v. Black Horse Pike Regional Board of Education, Gearon
v. Loudoun County School Board, or Adler v. Duval County School
Board. In these cases, students requested to have prayers, they composed
them, and they delivered them at graduation. These cases are clearly
distinguishable from Lee, and the Supreme Court could uphold the
constitutionality of graduation prayer in these cases without diluting Lee.

63. Adler, 851 F. Supp. at 456 (quoting Jones v. Clear Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 977
F.2d 963, 97 (5th Cir. 1991)).
64. See also Goluba v. School Dist. of Ripon, 1995 WL 8235 (7th Cir. Jan. 11, 1995);
Brody v. Spang, 957 F.2d 1108 (3d Cir. 1992); lngebretsen v. Jackson Public Sch. Dist., 864
F. Supp. 1473 (S.D. Miss. 1994); Griffith v. Teran, 794 F. Supp. 1054 (D. Kan. 1992)
reconsidered in light of Lee v. Weisman, 807 F. Supp. 107 (D. Kan. 1992); Society of
Separationists, Inc. v. Taggart, 862 P.2d 1339 (Utah 1993).
65. See Justice Kennedy's Tortured Opinion in Schweitzer, supra note 3, at 434-39. For
example, as noted above, the school principal invited a rabbi to deliver the prayers and
furnished him with guidelines though the rabbi was left to compose the prayers himself. Justice
Kennedy nevertheless asserted that the principal "directed and controlled the content of [the
rabbi's prayer]" and that school officials "monitored prayer" and attempted to "compose
official prayers." Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2656 (1992). Similarly, although there
was no indication that graduating students and others in the audience were asked to stand or
to bow their heads or did either of these things when the rabbi spoke, Justice Kennedy asserted
that school officials "compel[led students] to participate in a religious exercise." /d. at 2661.
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The district court in Gearon favored an absolute ban on graduation
prayers and had the candor to acknowledge that neither the Supreme
Court in Lee nor any other court had held that an absolute prohibition
was required by the Establishment Clause. 66 The Gearon court made
an alternate holding that the state was excessively entangled with religion;
the high school principals arranged to have the seniors vote on the prayer
issue, and some of the principals reviewed the remarks before they were
made. The first factor-principals arranging a student vote-is immaterial, but one can make a colorable claim that the prior review of religious
remarks did violate the entanglement prong of the Establishment
Clause. 67
The Ninth Circuit opinion in Harris, on the other hand, is most
unpersuasive. Its finding of "ultimate control" over the graduation
ceremonies by the school-because the seniors only had the authority to
make decisions concerning graduation where the school allowed them to
have it-is irrelevant and disregards the record evidence that the school
authorities in no way influenced either the decision to have prayers or the
content of the prayers the students delivered. Equally irrelevant is the
fact that the school provides the building in which graduation is held and
incurs the expenses. Public funding and "ultimate control" retained by
the school authorities are characteristic of all graduations, and to say that
such factors are pivotal is to exclude any possibility of constitutional
graduation prayer. 68 Rather than engaging in such spurious "analysis,"
the court would have been more candid in holding that graduation prayer
is per se unconstitutional. In addition, it verges on senselessness to
assimilate school assemblies to graduation ceremonies on the basis of the
fact that the school officials set the time for both, thereby ignoring all the
obvious differences between the classroom environment and the
commencement ceremony. 69

66. Gearon v. Loudoun County Sch. Bd., 844 F. Supp. 1097, 1100 (E.D. Va. 1993).
Of course, District Judge Bryan seems to have caught the spirit of though surpassing Justice
Kennedy's exaggeration when Judge Bryan asserted that to involuntarily subject a student at
his graduation to a display of religion that is offensive or not agreeable to his/her religion "is
to constructively exclude that student from graduation." /d.
67. It should be emphasized that Gearon is the only one of the cases discussed in which
such prior review occurred.
68. The dissent in Harris provided the correct answer to the majority's argument: "The
Supreme Court has clarified that custodial oversight 'does not impermissibly entangle
government in the day-to-day surveillance or administration of religious activities."' Harris
v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241,41 F.3d 447,460 n.2. (9th Cir. 1994) (Wright, J., dissenting in
part) (quoting Board of Educ. of Westside Community Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 253
(1990)).
69. In applying Collins (concerning school assemblies) to Harris, the Ninth Circuit
stated, "That school officials establish the time of graduation renders irrelevant the fact that
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Similarly, the Ninth Circuit exhibits myopia in its inability to discern
any secular purpose in having graduation prayers. Again, Judge Wright
in dissent had an appropriate response: "The School District merely
accommodates the students' decision. Accommodation of and incidental
benefits to religion do not violate the Establishment Clause. Accommodation does not endorse religious belief over disbelief, but rather
shows respect for the fundamental values of others. " 70 By all accounts,
some students are intensely desirous of distinguishing this landmark event
in their lives with prayer, and there is plainly a secular purpose in
attempting to satisfy such aspirations.
On balance, the Idaho federal district judge in Harris, the Fifth
Circuit in Jones v. Clear Creek, and the Florida federal district judge in
Adler v. Duval County School Board have the more persuasive arguments. It bears reiterating that the school authorities in those cases did
not decide to have prayers or in any way regulate or monitor the content
of the prayers, all of which were delivered by students. The school
authorities acquiesced in the student majority's desire for such prayers,
reserved time in the graduation program schedule, and then left the
students to their own devices. Accordingly, these cases more closely
resemble Widmar v. VincenF 1 and Board of Education of Westside
Community Schools v. Mergens 12-in which schools gave a place to meet
to student religious groups without compromising First Amendment
principles-than Lee v. Weisman, with its significant degree of control
over the prayer by the school authorities.
I have argued in two previous articles, and I continue to believe, that
graduation school prayer can be constitutional under carefully controlled
circumstances. 73 The fact patterns of the cases discussed embody such
circumstances, with the possible exception of Gearon. However, the
fault lines in the federal courts appear to be widening and other courts are
probably destined to align themselves with either the Fifth Circuit or the
Third and Ninth Circuits on this issue. It appears that the split in
authority will soon make it appropriate if not necessary for the Supreme

graduation does not take place during normal school hours." Harris, 41 F.3d at 454 n.5.
Under such reasoning, any prayer or religious activity on school premises would be unconstitutional, since presumably they would have to take place at times approved by school officials,
and Mergens was wrongly decided.
70. ld. at 460 (Wright, J., dissenting in part) (citations omitted).
71. Widmarv. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (holding that permitting a student religious
group to meet on state university premises did not violate the Establishment Clause).
72. Board of Educ. of Westside Community Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990)
(upholding the federal Equal Access Act, which protects the rights of student religious clubs,
inter alia, to meet on public high school premises before or after class hours).
73. See generally Schweitzer, supra note 3; Schweitzer, supra note 9.
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Court to consider another graduation prayer case and resolve some of the
questions the Court left unanswered in Lee v. Weisman.

